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Young people are seen as the hope and promise for our 
future. Their views and actions will shape tomorrow’s society. 
With this in mind, it is even more disturbing and worrying when 
those same young people get involved in groups that reject 
existing society and, more specifically, when they use political 
violence to do so. This is illustrated by the current flow of young 
people wanting to join the “Islamic State” and fight jihad in 
Syria, a problem that represents a serious issue today in many 
Western countries.1 Until now, the main response of 
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1 Estimates show that currently about 400–450 
Belgians are involved in the fighting in Syria, of 
which an estimated 120 have already returned. 
governments has been one of repression. In Belgium the BELFI 
project seeks to withdraw financial means and benefits from 
individuals and NGOs that financially or physically support the 
fighting in Syria,2 while the Belgian federal government has 
adopted a series of laws that make it a criminal offence to 
travel abroad for terrorist purposes and permit identity 





3 For more details on the new and amended laws 
concerning the fight against terrorism, see the rele-
vant commission reports: law on the revocation of 
passports (http://www.deka-
mer.be/FLWB/PDF/54/1200/54K1200004.pdf); 
law on the fight against terrorism 
(http://www.deka-
mer.be/FLWB/PDF/54/1198/54K1198005.pdf); 
law on access to Belgian territory 
(http://www.deka-
mer.be/FLWB/PDF/54/1197/54K1197005.pdf); 
law on the temporary revocation of national identity 
cards (http://www.deka-
mer.be/FLWB/PDF/54/1170/54K1170007.pdf). 
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The process of (violent) radicalisation and subsequently joining of radical or violent extremist groups was studied using semi-structured 
interviews with (young) people who considered themselves as radicals or violent extremists in left-wing, right-wing or religious settings. The 
data was gathered in Belgium from March through November 2013. Though modest in number (12), the interviews tell us a lot about factors 
that play a role in (violent) radicalisation and the organisation of radical or violent extremist groups through online and offline recruitment and 
daily activities. The results of the interviews are linked to the existing theoretical frameworks on (violent) radicalisation, including factors 
underlying engagement and recruitment. They show that new social media are not as relevant as currently asserted, but that offline methods 
of recruitment are still uppermost. They also make clear that the content of the ideology is not the first impetus for searching, but that a general 
discontent with society comes first, a search for ways of dealing with this discontent, and an orientation associated with the search. This has 
implications for the way society should deal with young people and radical convictions and the alternatives that should be provided. 
 
Keywords: radicalisation, violent extremism, new social media, internet, recruitment 
 
 
IJCV: Vol. 11#02/2017 







However, if governments want to avoid the (violent) 
radicalisation of their own youth and thus the manifestation of 
radical or violent extremist groups within their territory, a 
repressive approach will not be sufficient. 4 Since these groups 
and their members reject the society they are part of, it is 
unlikely that they will respond to sanctions imposed by that 
same society. So, in addition to the repressive approach, a 
better preventive and deradicalisation policy is needed 
(Horgan 2009; Bjørgo and Horgan 2009; Horgan and Taylor 
2011). In order to develop a constructive and efficient 
prevention approach, is it necessary to unravel the process of 
violent radicalisation and get a better understanding of how 
young people come to make the decision to join a radical or 
even violent extremist group. 
Why and how young people enter radical or even violent 
extremist groups remains very difficult to study, as getting the 
people involved to talk about their experiences is a challenge. 
In this article, we aim to present insights into the process of 
(violent) radicalisation of young people by analysing the 
discourses of those that have experienced this process, 
especially focusing on the relevance of the internet and NSM. 
As such, they give us insights into their mindsets, incentives 
and experiences. This analysis is carried out on the basis of 
twelve interviews with respondents from different backgrounds 
and with different ideologies: left-wing, right-wing and religious 
extremism. We aim to look at three issues more specifically: 
(1) what initiated the process of (violent) radicalisation, (2) 
why and how respondents joined radical or violent extremist 
groups, and (3) to what extent we can speak of online versus 
offline (violent) radicalisation. To grasp these issues, we first 
outline what is already known about the process of (violent) 
radicalisation (part 1), (self-)recruitment (part 2) and the role 
 
4 We refer explicitly to violent radicalisation since 
the process of radicalisation may end in violent ex-
tremism, but does not automatically do so (Borum 
2011a). 
5 Examples of different explanatory models can be 
found in the cognitive opening model (Wiktorowicz, 
2004), the staircase model (Moghaddam 2005), 
and the pyramid model (McCauley and Moskalenko 
2008). See also the three-stage process model of 
Horgan (2004). 
6 The listing of risk and protective factors leading to 
violent extremism has resulted in a large knowledge 
of the internet and NSM (part 3). Then, we relate the interview 
results (part 4 and 5) to these theoretical points of departure. 
 
1. Entering the Process of Radicalisation 
Radicalisation as a process refers to the development of 
increasingly violent and extremist attitudes. Consequently, in 
this research we use the term violent radicalisation when 
referring to the process in which violent extremist attitudes are 
developed, ultimately resulting in the use of political violence 
(Borum 2011a; Schmid 2013). Violent extremism and 
radicalism refer to different phases in this process. Radicalism 
promotes a radical fundamental alternative to the status quo, 
which is seen as unacceptable. However, compromise and 
dialogue are possible. The means used to obtain this goal are 
in principle non-violent, although specific situations may 
escalate (Schmid 2013; see also Borum 2011a; Neumann 
and Rogers 2007). Violent extremism also opposes 
mainstream society, but unlike to radicalism it fully denounces 
pluralism, strongly emphasises ideology, and always accepts 
violence as a legitimate means to obtain and hold on to power. 
This manifests itself in violent attitudes, political violence, or 
both (Bartlett Birdwel and King 2010; Schmid 2013). 
(Violent) radicalisation should be placed within a broader 
context (Kundnani 2012). Although there is discussion about 
the different phases involved,5 researchers agree that the 
actual process of (violent) radicalisation is preceded by a “pre-
phase” in which this broader context can create a breeding 
ground for further radicalisation (Bjørgo 2002; van der Valk 
and Wagenaar 2010). The literature provides a long and 
diverse list of risk factors possibly contributing to this breeding 
ground (Bjørgo 1997; Horgan 2004). 
In order to address issues of causality through such a risk-
factor approach,6 Bouhana and Wikström (2008, 2011) make 
base on the individual factors and circumstances 
that can be linked to this phenomenon. However, 
most risk factors are common to a large number of 
individuals of which only a minority will resort to vi-
olent extremism. This indicates that the listing of 
risk factors alone is not sufficient to explain individ-
ual violent extremism (see also Sageman 2004). 
The risk factor approach is not capable of distin-
guishing between real causes and correlates, 
generating confusion about what is important and 
what not, and causing research to be random (Bo-
rum 2011b; Horgan 2008). So far, there is no 
agreement on a general causal model of violent ex-
tremism (Christmann 2012). In order to address 
this issue, Bouhana and Wikström (2008 2011) 
propose to look for explanatory mechanisms, rather 
than risk-factors, 1) distinguishing background 
characteristics from real causal factors and 2) ex-
plaining what moves individuals to violent 
extremism. They do so by applying the situational 
action theory (SAT) framework to the explanation of 
violent extremism, or more specifically political vio-
lence (see Wikström 2014, 2004, 2005, 2010). 
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a distinction between the direct causes, or causal factors that 
directly influence action, and the indirect causes, or causal 
factors that influence the emergence of the direct causes, 
when explaining violent extremism (see also Wikström 2007, 
2014). They argue that elements of individual propensity 
towards violent extremism and elements of exposure to violent 
extremist settings form, in interaction with each other, the 
direct causes of violent extremism. Elements of the breeding 
ground, influencing these direct factors, have to be seen as 
indirect causes, or causes of the causes. 
Following this logic, risk factors found in the literature can be 
divided into (1) elements forming the breeding ground, (2) 
individual push factors (propensity), and (3) environmental 
pull factors (exposure). The breeding ground firstly 
encompasses contextual factors such as broad (global) 
structural, political, social, and economic processes, beyond 
the scope of individuals or even individual states, like 
segregation and overpopulation (Moors and van den Reek 
Vermeulen, 2010). Within this global context, local societal 
circumstances can arise, like unemployment and structural 
discrimination, which can provoke feelings of distrust, 
dissatisfaction, and (perceived) marginalisation (Coolsaet 
2005, 2015). Second, individuals differ in the way they 
perceive and define these contextual circumstances, which 
influences their attitudes and actions (Buijs Demant and 
Hamdy 2006; King and Taylor 2011; van der Pligt and Koomen 
2009). Social psychological mechanisms, like perceived 
injustice, perceived group threat, and perceived insecurity link 
the individual to the wider context by determining how 
individuals interpret certain societal and personal 
circumstances (Doosje, Loseman, and van den Bos 2013; see 
also Riek et al. 2009). Third, social mechanisms determine the 
social situation of the individual in relation to others in the 
same group (Bjørgo, 2002 2011; Doosje, Loseman and van 
den Bos 2013; Veldhuis and Bakker 2007). Poor social 
integration can lead to feelings of rejection and loneliness, 
leaving individuals unattached to society and thus free of 
constraints.7 Especially individuals who are searching, either 
for social inclusion and belonging (Bjørgo 2002, 2011) or for 
 
7 See also Hirschi (1969) and Agnew (2004) on 
the importance of social bonds. 
meaning and identity (King and Taylor 2011), are particularly 
vulnerable.  
Individual push factors entail (1) certain personality traits 
that can make individuals more susceptible to certain 
experiences, like impulsivity or a need for kicks (King and 
Taylor 2011; Victoroff 2005; Bjørgo 2002), and (2) emotions 
like frustration, hate, anger and fear that may have an 
influence on behaviour and action readiness (Silke 2008; 
Veldhuis and Bakker 2007; van der Pligt and Koomen 2009). 
Environmental pull factors encompass (1) the attractiveness of 
the violent extremist group claiming to address certain issues 
and fulfil certain fundamental social and psychological needs 
(Mellis 2007; Bjørgo 2002 2012), (2) ideological recognition 
(Sillke 2008), and (3) significant others, like friends or family, 
that form a first link to the extremist ideology and extremist 
group (Olesen 2009; Sageman 2004; Bjørgo 2002 2011; 
Atran 2010). In addition, the process can be facilitated by 
catalysts such as trigger events (Silke 2008), and violence 
(either by or against the group) (van der Valk and Wagenaar 
2010; Bjørgo 2002).  
Literature suggests that the breeding ground for (violent) 
radicalisation is usually built upon experienced feelings of 
frustration and discontent with certain aspects of the 
individual’s personal life, society in general, and/or specific 
policy. Individuals going through this pre-phase typically meet 
other like-minded individuals and continue the process of 
radicalisation together. Although ideological arguments are the 
most common post-hoc justification given for membership in 
a radical or violent extremist group, (violent) radicalisation 
seems mostly rooted in this more socially-orientated breeding 
ground (Bjørgo, 1997; Buijs, Demant and Hamdy 2006; 
Venhaus 2010; Coolsaet 2015; Roy 2008; Murer 2011). 
Ideological recognition can steer the choice for a certain group, 
but in the majority of cases the specific ideological framework 
is adopted only after recruitment (Silke 2008; Doosje, 
Loseman and van den Bos 2013; Doosje et al. 2012).  
Radical and violent extremists often frame their message on 
the basis of (perceived) grievances that are already present 
among the target group (Thompson 2011; Wiktorowicz 2004; 
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Adams and Roscigno 2005). If the nature of these grievances 
matches what a certain radical or violent extremist group has 
to offer, radicalisation can occur (Mellis 2007). These groups 
mainly target vulnerable individuals, who are susceptible to the 
simple worldview and clear identity they have to offer. In 
general, radical and violent extremist movements seem to offer 
three things (Fermin 2009): (1) an answer to existential life 
questions, (2) a political activist response to injustice, and (3) 
a sense of home and belonging. This corresponds to the three 
important grounds for (violent) radicalisation (Buijs, Demant 
and Hamdy 2006): (1) the need for meaning and significance, 
(2) a response to (experienced) injustice, and (3) the need for 
social inclusion. If individuals perceive these things as missing 
in their lives, radical and violent extremist groups can become 
very attractive, especially when there are no positive 
alternatives perceived in regular society. 
 
2. Recruitment and Contact with Extremist Groups 
Recruitment is often seen as the endpoint of a simple 
process where innocent individuals are brainwashed and 
manipulated by criminal third parties (Neumann and Rogers 
2007). However, in practice recruitment is more complex and 
cannot be entirely captured by this top down description. The 
recruited individual often plays an active role as well. 
According to Opp (2009), recruitment can better be described 
as the process of identifying oneself with a movement. This can 
take place within any social or political movement, including 
extremist ones. Research by Murer (2011) showed that 
 
Figure 1: Ideal types of recruitment 
 
Source: Pauwels et al. 2014 
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searching individuals can come into contact with extremist 
groups in different ways: (1) via third parties, (2) through peer 
pressure/family, or (3) by self-recruitment. Self-recruitment 
refers to searching individuals on the lookout for a group that 
can provide a response to their needs. This includes those that 
are not certain about what they are searching for and need 
the(extremist) group to shape their grievances.8 Olesen 
summarizes this as follows: 
 
Recruitment is the process through which individuals become 
part of a collective and come to share the views and goals of this 
collective. […] Recruitment to activism is a voluntary decision on 
the part of the individual. The individual, however, can be more 
or less proactive in the process. At least three ideal-typical path-
ways to recruitment can be specified: 1) individuals identify an 
organization they sympathize with and approach it; 2) organiza-
tions actively seek out potential recruits; 3) individuals are 
recruited through friendship and family networks. (Olesen 2009, 
8) 
 
Based on the literature Pauwels et al. developed four ideal 
types describing different recruitment pathways according to 
the positioning on two axes, as shown in Figure 1 (Pauwels et 
al. 2014). The main distinguishing element is the presence of 
social relations (Neumann and Rogers 2007). The first axis 
represents the spectrum between active and passive 
recruitment. In case of passive recruitment, an individual is 
noticed by a third party and brought into the movement, even 
though this was not the subject’s explicit intention. In the case 
of active recruitment, individuals actively search for a group or 
something the group has to offer (such as friendship, identity 
etc). The second axis displays the spectrum between 
intentional and unintentional recruitment. In case of 
intentional recruitment, the individual is aware that he is 
joining a certain movement and what the movement entails. In 
the case of unintentional recruitment, the individual more or 
less “accidentally” joins the movement. 
It should be noted that this typology only addresses 
recruitment from the standpoint of the individual. However, the 
extremist group can also play an active or a passive role (King 
 
8 This is not the same as self-radicalisation, which 
implies a complete individual radicalisation without 
any connection (online or offline) to an extremist 
group or movement (see also Pantucci 2011; Bur-
ton and Scott 2008). 
and Taylor 2011). Active groups are those outside the initial 
social network of searching individuals that wait for the right 
moment to convince possible recruits of their ideas and 
convictions. The individuals that are most likely to be 
successfully recruited are carefully identified before starting 
recruitment efforts, in order to maximize results (Brady, 
Schlozman, and Hamdy 1999). Passive groups are created 
bottom-up by like-minded individuals who already know each 
other and group together around a common standpoint. 
Official ties with formal organisations are not always present 
but passive groups can be inspired by them. Although formal 
organisations are not responsible for the formation and 
recruitment of the members of these groups, they can supply 
them with information, training and ideological inspiration, 
making them more dangerous. Of course, it is possible for a 
bottom-up group to evolve into a more active group. 
 
3. Internet and Online Radicalisation 
Since the 1990s the internet has become an indispensable 
part of daily life and is extremely widely used among the 
general population. Large numbers of people have easy access 
to the internet, providing in a large and easily reached 
audience.9 Especially online social networking, by means of 
NSM, has transformed the world into an “online village” with 
every offline actor represented online (Woolley, Limperos, and 
Oliver 2010). So it is no surprise that criminals, radicals, 
extremists and terrorists also use this medium to their 
advantage. The benefits that the internet entails for the general 
population in terms of communication, information exchange, 
networking and privacy hold the same advantages for these 
groups (Stevens and Neuhmann 2009; Weiman 2010 2004).  
In general radical and violent extremist groups seem to use 
the internet in a similar way to other social and political 
movements,10 as an extension of their offline activities 
(Kohlman 2006; Dean, Bell and Newman, 2012; NCTB 2010). 
These groups also try to organise communication and 
information exchange, reinforce solidarity, and build a 
9 Approximately 81 percent of European house-
holds have home access to the Internet (Eurostat 
2015). 
10 In essence, violent extremist groups are still so-
cial and political movements (see Klandermans 
and Mayer 2010; Olesen 2009). 
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collective identity. More specifically, three activities are of 
importance in the context of (violent) radicalisation and 
recruitment (Bowman-Grieve 2011; NCTB 2010; Zhou et al. 
2005; Gerstenfeld, Grant and Chiang, 2003). First the 
spreading of propaganda and ideological frameworks (Browne 
and Silke 2011; Weimann and Tsfati 2002; Adams and 
Roscigno 2005). Second, networking and practical 
organisation (AIVD 2012; NCTb 2010; Benschop 2006; see 
also Adams and Roscigno 2005; Gerstenfeld, Grant and 
Chiang, 2003). And third, community formation (Simi and 
Futrell 2006; De Koster and Houtman 2009; Bowman-Grieve 
2011, see also Evans and Boyte 1992). 
Although it is clear that radical and violent extremist groups 
use the internet to their advantage, it is unclear whether or not 
this kind of internet usage, and exposure to it, has led to an 
increase in (violent) radicalisation and recruitment. Political 
actors and policymakers seem to agree that the internet 
facilitates the search for violent extremist information and 
contacts, making it easier to become involved in violent 
extremism (Conway 2012). The internet is perceived as a 
(dangerous) open haven of free speech where any kind of 
information can be offered and found, including violent 
extremist speech, videos, contacts, etc. (Arts and Butter 2009; 
Benschop 2006). 
However, researchers disagree over the causal relevance of 
internet exposure. They argue that messages of hate have 
always been around, including efforts to recruit others in the 
name of these messages and the use of new media to do so 
(Klein 2009; see also Trend 2007). Since both the context and 
the receiving audience are constantly changing over time, it is 
only logical that these groups try to stay up to date.  
 
11 RADIMED is short for RADIcalisation and social 
MEDia. This study is also reported by Pauwels and 
Still, the internet and especially NSM are more interactive 
than any other medium, making real-time interaction possible 
in cyberspace (see Thompson 2011). Compared to traditional 
media, the internet, and especially NSM, are extremely well 
placed to provide for (1) easy and constant access to extremist 
narratives encouraging violent extremism and (2) the 
necessary social bonds and networks to sustain and develop 
initial interests, hence guiding the way to recruitment. 
Research by the RAND Corporation (von Behr et al. 2013) 
concluded that the internet can facilitate the process of 
(violent) radicalisation and recruitment by enhancing 
opportunities to (1) access information and communication 
and (2) confirm existing beliefs by forming “echo chambers” 
for violent extremist beliefs. However, Behr and colleagues 
conclude that the internet does not function as a substitute for 
in-person contact, suggesting it only supports offline processes 
of violent radicalisation and recruitment that are already taking 
place (see also Stevens and Neumann 2009; Simi and Futrell 
2006; ISD 2012). 
 
4. Methodology 
In this paper, we aim to build on the literature by sharing 
empirical results on the aforementioned three topics: (violent) 
radicalisation, (self-)recruitment, and the role of NSM. This 
paper draws on empirical data gathered in the framework of a 
two-year study, under the title RADIMED, assessing the role 
and influence of NSM in the process of radicalisation (Pauwels 
et al 2014).11 The study consisted of a quantitative phase, in 
which an online survey was conducted among Belgian 
adolescents aged between 16 and 24 years, followed by a 
qualitative phase, in which semi-structured interviews were 
carried out. In this paper, only the results of the qualitative 
De Waele (2014) with a focus on extreme right 
groups. 
Table 1: Survey respondents 
 Men Women Flanders Wallonia Brussels 
Left-wing extremism 5 2 5 - 2 
Right-wing extremism 4 - 2 1 1 
Religious extremism 1 - - 1 - 
TOTAL 10 2 7 2 3 
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phase will be reported because they provide most insight into 
the motives and backgrounds of respondents.  
In the interviews, left-wing, right-wing, and religious 
extremists were interviewed, between March and November 
2013.12 After this period, a total of twelve interviews (five 
conducted in Wallonia and Brussels and seven conducted in 
Flanders) were deemed relevant and used for research 
purposes (Table 1). The target group profile was originally 
“preferably young people between 16 and 24 years (or older) 
who have radical or extremist convictions and are committed 
to a group in an online and/or offline context”. The main 
strategies used to find people matching this profile were the 
internet (extremist websites, forums, Facebook pages), a call 
for candidates as part of the online survey, and the use of key 
respondents. Most respondents were contacted through key 
contacts. Only two respondents were successfully contacted 
on online fora or websites. Leads from the online survey 
yielded two additional interviews. 
The main technique used to obtain data was the semi-
structured interview. Respondents were asked to discuss 
various topics and encouraged to tell their stories in their own 
words. Using a topic list, the interviewers guided the interview 
to ensure that relevant research topics were well-covered 
during the interview. All interviews, except one, were conducted 
face-to-face and recorded. The remaining interview was 
conducted through a Facebook account created for research 
purposes. Two interviews were “enriched” by e-mail, in addition 
to the face-to-face interview. On average, each interview took 
one and a half hours. Each respondent was reminded of the 
objectives of the research, the particularities of the interview 
and the promised anonymity of the data.  
For this paper, all the interviews were recoded by both 
authors independently, using Nvivo. Nvivo is qualitative 
analysis software that allows interview materials to be 
structured and coded and supports analysis of the data. As the 
research question of this paper was very focused and was not 
part of the central question in the study in general, full recoding 
was necessary. We hence developed a new coding system and 
 
12 The main focus of the research was on young 
people active in a movement outside the main-
stream political field and holding the potential for 
extremism 
structure on the basis of the research question for this paper. 
At fixed intervals, the authors put together their coding results 
and discussed the contents of codes and coding procedures 
to optimise validity and ensure that there was agreement on 
the content of categories (Weston et al. 2001). After this 
coding phase, results were discussed and ultimately combined 
in this paper. Some limitations of the data have to be 
addressed. First, interviews were conducted during a relatively 
short period. Given the sensitive nature of the subject, it would 
have been preferable to perform long-term fieldwork in order 
to build trust and expand access. At the time of the interviews 
the political discussion over young Belgian fighters in Syria had 
created a sphere of fear and hostility towards Islam, making 
most Muslim individuals who were approached during the 
research reluctant and suspicious of participating. Second, the 
respondents found online were not immediately inclined to 
participate in an offline interview, mainly because the 
anonymity guaranteed by online interaction would not be 
present in the case of face-to-face interaction. This resulted in 
one interview being conducted online, through Facebook. 
Third, selecting respondents on the basis of their level of 
extremism posed some problems in terms of inclusion and 
exclusion criteria. This resulted in the selection of different 
profiles, from radicals through genuine violent extremists. 
However, this did allow study of different pathways of (violent) 
radicalisation and comparison of the use of NSM within them. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
In this section we relate the results of the interviews to the 
three topics mentioned above. The results are organised in 
chronological order, starting with the search for inclusion (the 
pre-phase) and ending with in-group activities (online and 
offline). We relate some of the respondents’ answers to their 
ideology or the group they are connected with, but not for all 
themes. There is not always a link between the ideology they 
stand for and other variables, such as social relations, peer 
pressure, decision-making, and so on. It is therefore much 
IJCV: Vol. 11#02/2017 







more relevant to look at the processes these young people 
have gone through, irrespective of the ideological path they 
follow. However, we will of course mention differences between 
left, right, and religious extremism where relevant (for example 
when discussing views on society, group discrimination, etc.). 
 
5.1. (Violent) Radicalisation: Pre-phase 
5.1.1. Feelings of Injustice 
The pre-phase of (violent) radicalisation is described in the 
literature as represented by factors of broad social issues that 
add to a feeling of injustice or relative deprivation. This leads 
to discontent and dismay with society (Doosje, Loseman and 
van den Bos 2013; Bjørgo 1997; Fermin 2009; Buijs, Demant 
and Hamdy 2006). This general feeling of dissatisfaction could 
be recognised in the discourses of all respondents, although 
the reasons for their discontent, and the analysis of who is to 
blame, are different for each respondent, and are among the 
very rare issues that can be linked to the orientation of the 
respondent (left, right, religious extremism).  
The starting point of (violent) radicalisation for almost all 
respondents is found in a growing perception of injustice and 
inequality in society. Respondents state that they are 
confronted with these issues on a daily basis. These feelings 
may be based on their own experience, such as direct 
victimisation or discrimination, but can also be based on more 
general tendencies, events on a meso- or macro level, close 
by or far away, sometimes not even involving the respondent 
him/herself. As stated earlier, these experiences seem to differ 
depending on the ideology they adhere to. For example, right-
wing oriented respondents give concrete, personal examples 
of injustice that they have experienced personally as triggers 
for their involvement in or search for support from violent 
extremist groups. They consider themselves as part of a “white 
native Belgian” in-group group that is treated unfairly by 
others. They assert that a certain group, of foreign descent, is 
responsible for their perceived injustice and want this to be 
addressed. They do not want an entirely different society, but 
ask for certain amendments that rule out “taking advantage of 
things” and protect their own rights. 
 
When I started attending high school, I saw people of all origins. 
Of course, I was always taught to be kind and that every individual 
is equal. I tried to get along with everyone, but after some time I 
learned that I was not at all welcome in the “diversified groups”. 
As time went by in school, I found myself in an exclusively white 
group, leaving aside some exceptions (two Turkish people who 
could speak and write Dutch perfectly). I often got into an argu-
ment with people of foreign descent as I was a blond guy and 
was assertive. They often got away with it, and told the principal 
that I was provoking them. I got punished for it a few times, be-
cause of those idiots. My sense of fairness was already affected 
in high school (…). These are just anecdotes and a small frag-
ment of what me and my family had to endure with this scum. 
One would become racially critical for less. (Arthur – male, radical 
right) 
 
I used to have a lot of confidence in the police when I was young 
(…) but this started to change when, after an aggressive attack 
in which I was forced to use my pepper spray, the police arrested 
me, handcuffed me, even though I was the one that had been 
victimised. (…) My doubts grew when the public prosecutor de-
cided to force me to compensate my chief attacker, who, 
according to him, had to wear glasses after my attack with the 
pepper spray. The thesis of the public prosecutor was that I, on 
my own, had assaulted ten young Turks, in broad daylight, in the 
city centre, five hundred metres from my high school, and that 
they considered me a perpetrator, an aggressive actor, and my 
attackers as victims. Then I really experienced a great dysfunc-
tioning of the Belgian judicial system. That motivated my entry 
into the group. (Geoffrey – male, radical right) 
 
I often hear from my father and his colleagues that there are peo-
ple who do not pay their debts or that social security is this high, 
that his pension is not enough and of course that the “browning” 
of our city makes the streets unsafe (which both me and my 
friends have experienced more than once). (Arthur – male, radical 
right) 
 
On the other hand, left-wing respondents mainly refer to 
general social problems and injustice in society. This injustice 
is then linked to the perception of minorities in society as 
victims of the system – minorities of which the respondent 
mostly is not a part. The in-group is therefore inclusive and very 
broad, as every member of a minority in society is considered 
to be a potential “victim”.  
Left-wing respondents seem to resist the system in general 
and strive for a totally different social model. They are 
disappointed with (what they call) capitalist society and do not 
understand why other people are not aware of how superficially 
they are living. Others refer to a perceived evolution into a 
gestapo-like society, or to the neglect of global warming. Some 
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of them say they were radicalised by what they read in school, 
or by their experiences in society in a broader sense (such as 
the gender gap). 
 
You notice that when you work in a factory as a student and you 
get paid little for what you do, and you see that other people for… 
you see that people who do not have to work, who own capital, 
can live more easily, yes, that are huge inequalities (…). I am 
more, when I became more active around climate-related topics, 
this was because I was a privileged student, well, bourgeois, not 
really confronted with the larger problems in the world, but seeing 
problems in the third world and the climate… Other people strug-
gle themselves or their parents struggle financially, and become 
engaged as a result. (Julius – male, radical left) 
 
I had an easy childhood on a social level, but not in other do-
mains. I already had to fight in my childhood and now I have to 
fight because I’m a woman. Everyone has a role pattern and there 
are certain expectations. Women are made to have children and 
to do housekeeping. But in this society that is almost impossible: 
housekeeping, have a social life, and a good career, and this,and 
that… sometimes it all becomes too much. (Mary – female, radi-
cal left) 
 
Islam-related respondents refer both to their own 
experiences and to the experiences of the broad minority they 
are part of. This is very much linked to their identity as Muslims, 
both in terms of causes of deprivation, but also as a source of 
a positive self-image. They consider the worldwide group of 
Muslims as being treated unfairly. They have the feeling that 
they are continuously disadvantaged in relation to the general 
population. They feel they are not listened to – or positively 
ignored – by policymakers. This results in a perception that they 
do not have a chance of succeeding within the system, even if 
they play by the rules, which makes them look for alternatives. 
 
Today, I’m in a state of mind where I do not want to wait any 
longer. With my children in mind, I do not want to wait another 
three or four generations to solve these questions. For certain 
sectors this has to be done through the law. Today, wearing a 
headscarf is prohibited in secondary schools. There is no argu-
ment: we will take legal action and revise school policy from 
within. After this, well, for issues like employment, we do realise 
that it won’t necessarily be the law that will be able to resolve 
this. Here we need a compromise at the level of society. So, this 
is why these issues radicalised me, because today, when I speak 
to groups, I’m much more reserved about the elements I defend, 
clearly saying that if things continue this way, Belgian society only 
allows one possible voice of integration for Muslims, that being 
the Islamic pillar. (Harold – male, radical Islam) 
 
It’s easy to say it like this but… it is really a hard emotional burden 
because they see their brothers getting killed and feel as if noth-
ing is being done about it, they are also sometimes in despair 
because of their social-economic status, the students at my 
school, they call it “trash-can school” … (laughs). It’s a last-
chance school, where they go when they are transferred from 
other schools, in an area where there is between 40 and 50 per-
cent unemployment among youth, and they know very well that 
when they leave school, they will probably have nothing to do. 
They are in despair… (…) They are often very open to religious 
issues and when it is suggested to them,… well… they are told: 
listen, you can fight for your brothers and they know how to do 
this, they are often well-paid, they are promised a lot, and all their 
crimes are forgiven because they fight for Allah. (Sebastian – 
male, radical left) 
 
This injustice is not only an element of (violent) radicalisation 
in terms of the experience of injustice itself, but also in terms 
of the perception that perceived injustice is not tackled by 
society or the authorities. On the contrary, respondents feel 
that it is even sustained by society. Respondents state that 
they have started their “quest” when they failed to find suitable 
answers to their questions from traditional actors. This is a 
common denominator in all ideologies, but with different 
accents and consequences. 
Sometimes this search for alternatives is complemented by 
a search for social inclusion, social connections and/or a 
positive identity. The feelings of injustice, in combination with 
a negative experience in the past, give respondents the idea of 
“not belonging” to the people around them who support the 
status quo and cannot provide answers for their problems. 
 
5.1.2. Identity and Ideology 
Research shows that it is not the specific ideology that is 
essential at the start of (violent) radicalisation, but rather the 
search for an identity and social inclusion (Bjørgo 2012, 1997; 
Buijs, Demant, and Hamdy 2006; Sageman 2004; Roy 2008). 
As already mentioned, radical and violent extremist groups in 
general seem to provide three things: (1) an answer to 
injustice, (2) a positive identity, and (3) a feeling of belonging. 
This also seems to be the case for the respondents. Although 
certain characteristics seem to push them in a specific 
direction, the results of their quest seems to be more or less 
“coincidental”. Most respondents did not start their search 
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from a specific ideology; the ideology was adopted during the 
search. 
 
But if I had grown up in Lasnes and not in Saint-Josse (Brussels), 
and attended a different school and lived in a whole other envi-
ronment, I could have been with the labour party, or militant, or 
with a sect, or,… I don’t know! I could have done many things. 
Circumstances have brought me to the (anonymised) today, 
given my personal environment, etc. To be more precise, I went 
to a high school that was attended by a lot of hooligans. And I 
was the scapegoat, I was easily harassed, annoyed, etc. (Geof-
frey – male, radical right) 
 
All respondents start their search from a very critical view on 
society and from a disappointment with current politics, 
authorities and policymakers. Some refer to capitalism 
(ironically including a respondent who works as a banker) and 
exploitation, others refer to the meaning of life. It is also 
striking that they have invested heavily in gathering information 
from diverging viewpoints on social processes and institutions. 
 
No matter what information I get, I ask a lot of questions (why? 
How did we get into this situation etc.). I ask a lot of relevant 
questions, friends and colleagues know me like this :). (Arthur – 
male, radical right) 
 
When I was fifteen to twenty years old, I had rebelled against 
society, a rebellion against the systems, authorities,… and finally 
this turned me to the extreme-right groups, but it could have also 
turned me to the extreme-left groups, or somewhere else. It is 
also related to the people I met. (Geoffrey – male, radical right) 
Total disillusionment with the traditional political parties. In fact, 
the starting point of my commitment, I think, is that I was revolted 
by the fact that in terms of technology there is enough for every-
one to live comfortably on the planet, but that this does not 
happen like this. (…) This was also the time of the war in Afghan-
istan, which I followed closely, afterwards there was the war in 
Iraq and in-between the two my political commitment really de-
veloped. (Lizzy – female, radical left) 
 
Information is gathered in different places, both from sources 
within their own ideology and sources outside that ideology (or 
contrary to it). For example, left-wing respondents also look for 
information on right-wing websites. This does not mean that 
the ideological identity of the movement they sympathise with, 
in a broad sense, is chosen entirely arbitrarily. Rather, the 
ideological preference of the individual seems to determine 
what kind of groups are attractive and which groups are not. 
This ideological preference tends to be shaped by the social 
environment, family history, certain experiences, emerging 
opinions etc. Once the person is engaged in the group, further 
ideological development takes place. 
 
5.1.3. Social Environment: The Role of Family and Peers 
During the interviews, respondents were asked how their 
surroundings reacted to their active involvement in radical or 
violent extremist groups. The responses differed little between 
ideologies, but depended on the individual circumstances and 
context of the respondents. Some of the respondents stated 
that they had adopted the ideology of their parents and 
families, and translated this into an engagement of their own. 
In these cases, they have been confronted with their parents’ 
viewpoints on social issues and out-groups from a very young 
age, and have accepted their perspectives and points of view.  
 
In some cases, this is learned at a very early age. Parents 
can be role models, and in those cases their ideology is 
adopted. However, there are differences with regard to the level 
of conviction and engagement, and the strength of their 
principles. For example, one respondent was very active in a 
right-wing group, while his parents, who held the same views, 
were not actively involved. The converse is also possible: 
 
(interviewer: Do you talk about this a lot?)  
No, it’s just: they say “there’s a demonstration about this and 
that, do you want to join us?” (…) My parents are both even more 
active and radical than I am. Yes, then you notice that you have 
been aware of this since early childhood and that you can be 
actively involved, instead of just putting your signature some-
where. (Mary – female, radical left) 
 
For this to occur, the individual must agree with the concerns 
of their family and perceive them as fundamentally 
problematic, necessary and possible to influence through 
(their own) action. This means their engagement may contrast 
with a lack of engagement among siblings who have grown up 
in the same political family context. Respondents mention 
brothers and sisters who are not as politically active as they 
are because they do not see the problem in current society, do 
not think their actions will make any difference, or are too 
young to understand the gravity of the issue. 
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I think they still need a push. When I look at my sister, she’s 
completely different from me, and she is not concerned about 
this. My brother is, but he is more like “I know, I will sign this, but 
is it useful for me to do that?” (Mary – female, radical left) 
 
Their right-wing orientation is based on their upbringing and the 
ideas we were given. I think the fact that they are right-wing is 
based on following, and not thinking for yourself about what you 
are doing or thinking. They are not really good in arguing, and 
they can not explain why they think like this. They do not look for 
examples of how left-wing people think and that is why I am more 
open for other ways of thinking and why I am more left-oriented 
than they are. (Garry – male, radical left) 
 
At the other end of the spectrum, there are also examples of 
respondents who have completely rejected their parents’ and 
family’s opinions, and have rebelled against their views and 
ideology. One of the respondents reported that he took a 
completely opposite stand to his parents. He was born in a 
right-wing environment and turned to a left-wing group around 
the age of fifteen. On the basis of a positive experience with a 
classmate of foreign descent, he decided that the vision he 
had been taught was not the right one for him. He developed 
a different vision and a different view of the future, which 
resulted in many discussions with his father on this topic, even 
today. Acquiring opposing information and knowledge on 
topics of discussion seems to provide empowerment and a 
feeling of control. Furthermore, membership in a group can 
provide a feeling of social inclusion that is missing when a 
person feels disconnected from the rest of their family. 
 
Three-quarters of my family is also right-wing. My grandfather at-
tends the “Ijzerwake” and I have joined him in the past but that 
is really… those thoughts are disgusting. There are also some 
good ideas, but it is almost extreme-right… (…) when I started to 
think about how the world is constructed and why certain things 
happen. But before that, I was raised rather strictly. My father is 
very right-wing and what he says was the truth – anyone with a 
different opinion was wrong. And then I started to think for myself 
and formed my own opinions. This resulted sometimes in very 
hard discussions and could lead to us not talking for a few days. 
(Interviewer: Now still?). Especially now… this is because, eeh… 
one hypothesis might be that people of foreign descent were my 
classmates, I remember our dad always talked about black peo-
ple… not against them but… that they are worth less than us 
white people. And that boy in my class was a cool guy and there 
was nothing wrong with him, in contrast with what our dad always 
said. (Garry – male, radical left) 
 
I live by my own principles, but that’s not easy when your family 
is different. We all get along, but I can’t live with their way of life. 
For now I have to put up with it, but when I am able to buy my 
own house, then I will be able to live according to my principles. 
(Cornelius – male, radical right) 
 
Parents? Yes, what do you think? They do not… they are not very 
happy with it. But they also see that a lot of things in politics are 
not working. The immigrants, everyone is fed up with it. It has got 
out of control. They do as they please. But they [parents] do not 
agree with how I do this. And especially not with regard to the 
“thing about the second world war”. That’s a no-go for people 
above certain generation, they can’t look any further. (Charles – 
male, extreme right) 
 
Friends can also impact the choice of a specific group. Other 
respondents said they had moved a certain direction based on 
information obtained in school. 
 
In the third year of secondary school, I had a teacher of cultural 
sciences who completely omitted his own personal opinion. But 
a class about communism set me thinking: what exactly is com-
munism, what’s positive about if and what’s negative etc? This 
interest grew further through the annual camp of my youth move-
ment, which was about the Spetsnaz. Those are the special 
forces. After this I started searching for more information and I 
gained knowledge on communism and socialism and this has 
triggered a lot. (Garry – male, radical left) 
 
So, it really is a commitment that started, I would say, within the 
school environment. Starting from there, on an organized level, 
this started with my uncle starting his own association. (Harold – 
male, radical Islam) 
 
In the group itself, I’m very active and discuss all kinds of things. 
(…). (Interviewer: and are you also able to discuss this with peo-
ple outside the group?) At work there are some, they are very 
politically engaged. So my work partly also led to this. (Fonzie – 
male, radical left) 
 
No, it is a bit “birds of a feather flock together”. I can talk to 
someone who has other ideas, but I’m not really drawn to them. 
(Mary – female, radical left) 
 
5.2. Active involvement 
Initial engagement in a specific group seems to be largely 
dependent on what is (directly) available in the social 
environment. Most respondents get in touch with the specific 
groups and movements they end up joining almost 
accidentally. If the availability is rather limited, active 
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engagement is aborted or postponed until new groups form or 
the respondent changes setting. 
 
I knew a few people who were a bit interested and lived in Flan-
ders and where I went now and then. But not really people that 
were actively involved. I was alone for years. I did post on forums 
and eventually, when I moved to this area, then I joined a local 
movement that was active here. They are no longer active now. 
And that is how I got in contact with that world. The internet, that’s 
not how you get to meet them. (Charles – male, extreme right) 
 
There was a summer school, called Marxist university, that pro-
vided lots of training. So I went there out of curiosity, without 
aiming to become a member or anything. But when I was there 
[…],and by talking to them, little by little, at a certain moment I 
realised I wanted to joint them. Because I was in phase in which 
I read a lot, and gathered information, but that was easy, in the 
end I did nothing. It is something else when you work in the field. 
So I said to myself that I wanted things to change, that if the 
whole world thought like me, and only read and informed them-
selves and thought that was enough, that nothing would change, 
and that it was necessary to take the plunge. (Sebastian – male, 
radical left) 
 
A lot also depends on the extent to which available social 
groups are capable of providing an answer to grievances. 
Groups will be excluded if they do not address grievances 
sufficiently. So it is necessary not only for individuals to be 
looking for answers, it is also necessary that groups offering 
the right answers are present in the setting (opportunity).  
For some respondents an engagement in general, 
mainstream political groups, or even political parties, precedes 
the joining of more radical/violent extremist groups. The switch 
occurs because of an awareness that the current group no 
longer fits their own needs, resulting in a more active search 
for a group better attuned to their personal viewpoints. This 
can be out of either ideological or practical considerations, or 
both. After initial engagement, respondents seem to undergo 
a further ideological development, guided by the ideological 
identity of the group. In the course of this ideological growth 
respondents can come to view the current group as no longer 
corresponding to their own specific ideological viewpoints, or 
to their ideas about the necessary changes and methods to 
achieve them. This can cause them to change movement as 
their own political and ideological consciousness grows and 
becomes more defined. 
 
I’m now in my sixth year of study. It was only in the second year 
that I got in touch with ideas that are critical towards society (…) 
and only from the third year that I started to get involved a bit 
and became more critical. (…) Then I got active in a more radical 
climate movement that is not connected to any particular political 
forum, but several people who think that capitalism is the prob-
lem of climate change and that you need an anti-capitalist 
solution. (Julius – male, radical left) 
 
Respondents also indicate having become disappointed with 
the envisioned social changes, the effectiveness of the group 
and the level of action undertaken to actually change the 
situation they perceive as problematic. 
 
The difference was, at the green party they do not do a lot, but 
the climate activists try to make a forceful statement by getting 
on the streets and so on; apart from their ideas, which I knew 
little about at that time. But the more activist approach made me 
join them, and after that the more radical ideas also influenced 
me. (Julius – male, radical left) 
 
But again, in this new and more active choice for a more 
suitable movement, respondents seem to be more or less 
dependent on what is available. This time however, their prior 
engagement provides them with a broader knowledge of which 
groups, within their ideological spectrum, are “available” and 
what they stand for and thus create a broader array of more 
specific options to choose from. 
In one case, being disappointed and feeling betrayed by the 
group directly prompted the respondent to start his own 
movement, taking a far more radical stance. 
 
That's the problem, that Muslims have capital gathered over at 
best twenty, thirty, forty years, where others have had capital al-
most since the creation of Belgium. But uh, I now have this vision 
whereas in the past I was like “No, pillarization is not the solution, 
we need a forum, we have to look at what we can put together.” 
So I don’t mind pooling our energy, but if at some point they lead 
you to believe that you are cooperating but it’s only an nice way 
of saying “what you provide is unacceptable and what I provide 
is in the public interest," I cannot accept that any more. And so 
we created a structure now called [anonymised], so I am one of 
the founders of that, where we deal with those questions and try 
to put them on the agenda where we say: “We will no longer let 
it drag on, we must get ourselves organized.” We put pressure on 
the centre because in our view the centre has not done enough 
on these questions. You cannot say they did nothing but they 
could have done more. We also see how the debate moves on 
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Islamophobia in France, so um, that's just where I am now com-
pared to this. (Harold – male, radical Islam) 
 
5.3. Online vs Offline 
The internet and NSM are used by both the group and by 
individual respondents. In both cases the use of the internet is 
mainly practical and intended to support and facilitate offline 
activities and/or maintain offline social contacts. 
According to our respondents the radical/violent extremist 
group mainly uses the internet as a means to inform and 
mobilise the general public. Especially NSM are seen as a 
good way to enhance visibility and provide information about 
the group’s identity, mission, goal and upcoming activities to 
a large number of individuals. Still, the internet and NSM are 
not perceived as very successful in their mobilisation efforts. 
Respondents indicate that although they seem to reach a 
broad audience online, this is generally not translated into a 
growing offline engagement. The number of active core 
members of a group tends to be small and remains fairly 
stable. The number of, mainly online, sympathisers is larger 
but they are not easily persuaded into offline engagement. One 
respondent commented that although internet and Facebook 
pages do reach a large number of people, they only reach 
those who are already interested in the group’s line of thinking. 
Individuals outside this political milieu are completely missed, 
implying that traditional offline and face-to-face recruitment 
(for example flyers, posters, bookstalls at events etc.) is still 
crucial. 
 
We came to the conclusion that our Facebook page worked best 
and that we gained many members because of it. We now have 
about six hundred and it keeps growing. And eh, that’s the most 
efficient way to communicate. But we also found that we only 
reach people who are already on our territory. We do not reach 
new students at [anonymised]. (Julius – male, radical left) 
 
For example, there is this website and they have four thousand 
likes and when they go to a demonstration only fifty people turn 
up. So there is a lot of liking and “oh we will come and partici-
pate” but in the end, there are many that do not. (Fonzi – male, 
radical left) 
 
No, it’s more for the outside world because I see the people in 
our group at least once a month at meetings. So what we post 
online is mainly what we want to spread externally, either specific 
information about the group or the community, or we use the in-
ternet for distributing information about [anonymized], but for 
people who live in our community and accidentally stumble on 
our page. (Sebastian-male-radical left) 
 
Respondents also indicated that the internet and mainly Face-
book are used by the group to extend its network, to allow 
members to keep in contact with each other and to announce 
(public) events. It is seen as an instrument, a mechanism like 
any other.  
 
It’s of course very complex and depends on which phase, in the 
phase in which people start to get more politically active, there 
offline contacts are important as you do not have those contacts 
on Facebook, and you do not know which websites to visit to find 
information.(…) I think we attract most young people through our 
stall, or through contacting people, young people who come to 
an activity. But once you are politicised, those social networks, 
Facebook – maybe it will evolve, but it is not a democratic me-
dium, but during recent years it has become very important as a 
medium – once you’re politically active, that’s your medium to 
post and receive messages on all kinds of activities. (Julius – 
male, radical left) 
 
Respondents also used the internet individually for mainly 
practical purposes. First, the internet is a useful source of 
contact with relevant groups and/or like-minded individuals. 
This is facilitated by the quick, easy, and anonymous access 
to online content on extremist websites, forums, Facebook 
pages etc. When the goal is to join an organised group, the 
internet and NSM are useful to find the group and its contact 
information. The use of the internet for this purpose seems to 
be only a gateway, as almost all respondents said they first 
heard of their group by means other than the internet, like 
meetings, events, word of mouth etc. In the first stage of 
making contact with a group, individuals have no preference 
between the use of online or offline access. However, when it 
comes to joining and being actively involved in a group, this 
requires an offline meeting. The respondents said that the 
offline meeting provides a guarantee of trust and good faith 
that the internet does not provide. 
 
You can show you’re interested. And through private messages, 
you can ask someone, can we… and you can end up meeting 
someone, but it will be a first meeting. You will not be directly… 
and then the next time you can join in somewhere. And if you stay 
active, you will start to fit in. If you show your face just once, then 
that’s it. (Charles – male, radical right) 
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As well as websites of specific groups, respondents also use 
the internet to visit more community-based fora or websites. In 
some cases they say they look for only information, without 
being interested in engaging in online discussions. Other 
respondents do seek to exchange ideas online with others on 
community fora or websites. This is especially the case for 
those who the need to be in a like-minded environment, but 
are not yet part of one. The use of the internet to enable these 
kind of social contacts is restricted to those individuals who do 
not perceive the opportunity to meet this need in their offline 
environment or are having difficulty meeting offline. These 
contacts often remain anonymous. One respondent, however, 
reported using Facebook for getting in touch with personal 
contacts, by only accepting offline friends as Facebook friends.  
 
The real thing is the most important. Online you’re not effective. 
You only feel useful when you can really commit yourself on the 
streets or at a meeting or something. As long as you can achieve 
something, be in a demonstration or something, that does not 
happen too often, but still… but online that is nothing, for me that 
is just social talk with comrades that I have not seen for a while, 
a daily activity […] But I only accept people that I know person-
ally. (Charles – male, radical right) 
 
Finally, the internet is currently the most popular alternative 
to mainstream media for searching for alternative information. 
Respondents indicated they had developed a mistrust against 
media and mainstream information along with a need for 
critical and correct information. The data show that even when 
faced with uncertainty about the reliability of information on 
the internet, it nevertheless seems preferable for the 
respondents to use this information to compare and criticise 
the “official” information.  
Individuals select information of interest for themselves but 
this does not mean that only information defending their point 
of view is selected. Some respondents said they had looked 
for information on ideological trends or groups opposed to their 
own. However, this information is not absorbed or even 
considered, but mainly used as background information to 
counter possible criticism. Thus, even so, the self-selection of 
information narrows down the information fields that are 
accessed. No respondent reported ever having experienced a 
dramatic change in opinion after being in contact with 
opposition information. This, together with the process of self-
selection as a whole, leads us to conclude that the emergence 
of extremist beliefs is a prerequisite for a more advanced 
search for information and commitment in a group. (This, of 
course, does not prevent beliefs evolving within the group.) 
 
6. Conclusion 
First of all, all the interviewees demonstrate a high degree of 
social commitment, and worry about the state of society. They 
are searching for ways to deal with their worries and discontent 
and experience an urgent need for active involvement with a 
view to changing society. At this point, this is still individual 
conviction and belief. If they are unable to find a connection 
with a group, or there is no social structure to become active 
with these ideas, this remains an individual search. Only once 
they find an instrument, such as a group, this can serve as a 
vehicle to become active and do something with their 
discontent. By joining a radical or violent extremist group, 
individuals find a motor for change. This search is also 
discussed in the literature (Fermin 2009), referring to 
existential life questions, answers to injustice, and looking for 
a sense of home and belonging.  
This implies that, although one can strive to ban radical and 
violent extremist groups, as long as the demand for these 
groups remains, this will lead to the constant development of 
new groups. The same goes for the websites run by these 
groups. This element of supply and demand can also be found 
in (violent) radicalisation models as developed by Mellis 
(2007). In settings where radical or violent extremist groups 
are present, more (violent) radicalisation will take place, as the 
settings provide a forum and a framework for (violent) 
radicalisation (and offer those involved the neutralisation 
mechanisms that go with it). In the long run, it might be more 
productive to (1) work on the breeding ground and (2) provide 
alternatives for the demand, by making mainstream 
movements accessible and responsive to the grievances of 
young people.  
As can be seen among the respondents, many young people 
join more or less mainstream movements that try to find 
solutions within the margins of the current political system. 
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They make social change possible, and do not present a 
problem, on the contrary. It becomes problematic however, 
when they feel unheard and unimportant. Then the sudden 
(violent) radicalisation of a certain group, such as the Syria 
fighters today, can also be a sign of a problem that society 
cannot respond to satisfactorily.  
As far as the internet goes, it is an important medium for 
gathering information and finding contacts, but where this is 
not combined with offline proximity, the online attraction soon 
fades. Peer pressure and family recruitment are prevalent in 
the stories of our respondents, both in the sense of following 
in their parents’ footsteps and in the sense of rejecting their 
parents’ ideology and searching for opposing beliefs.  
The interviews also reveal that ideology is not the first 
impetus for searching, but that there is initially a general 
discontent with society, on the whole a search for ways of 
dealing with this discontent, and an orientation that comes 
along with the search. The content of the orientation (for 
example left- or right-wing) is not the first step towards these 
groups. Rather, it is feelings of general discontent and 
perceived injustice that bring people to search for alternatives, 
whatever these may be. The experiences of the young people 
in this study are strikingly similar across the three ideological 
orientations studied. A number of respondents stated that they 
could very well have ended up at the other end of the spectrum 
(although specific experiences can and do make a certain 
direction more likely than others). This has implications for the 
way society should deal with young people and radical/violent 
extremist convictions and the alternatives that should be 
provided.  
These results imply that, in terms of prevention, perceived 
injustice rather than ideology is the first factor we need to work 
on. Also more attention should be directed to elements of 
perceived injustice and strain instead of to elements of relative 
deprivation and poverty (Coolsaet 2005). In studies 
addressing general offending this has already been 
recognised. This implies the need for a sound social policy and 
information provision, and the offering of alternatives to young 
people, in terms of mainstream groups that listen to them and 
help them build our society constructively. 
Finally, some limitations of this study have to be addressed. 
First, the results presented here rely on a small number of 
interviews. This is not necessarily problematic if a high quality 
of interviews is ensured, and is not unprecedented in existing 
empirical research, given the nature of the topic and the 
difficulty of reaching the population (Linden 2009). However, 
additional interviews would improve reliability and validity. 
Second, religious radical or violent extremist respondents are 
underrepresented, possibly distorting the results. Additional 
research focusing on each type of (violent) radicalisation 
separately is recommended. Third, although the reported 
experiences are similar between the three orientations under 
study, it is unclear to what extent the conclusions are valid 
across other forms of (violent) radicalisation. 
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